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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 13, 2020, Mary turned to her obstetrician (OB/GYN) questioning whether to go
through with her pregnancy in the time of COVID-19. 1 “I would do it . . . I mean, in different
circumstances I might continue the pregnancy. But now?” 2 The OB/GYN is empathetic, though
its effect hidden behind a surgical mask. 3 Mary continues, “[h]ow could I be pregnant during this
pandemic . . . [h]ow could I even get to appointments . . . what if I got sick?” 4 With three children
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at home, Mary’s presence at an abortion clinic during the pandemic not only affects the health and
safety of herself and her pregnancy but also the health and wellbeing of her family.
Women in Mary’s position face unique complications during the recent pandemic. Though
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists considered abortion an essential “timesensitive service,” some state governors issued executive orders suspending the practice in the
early weeks of the pandemic. 5 Because of safety concerns, people may increasingly favor selfmanaged abortion procedures without in-person consultation. 6 According to Aid Access, the only
online abortion telemedicine service in the United States, requests for self-managed medication
abortions in the United States increased 27% between March 20 and April 11 of 2020. 7 This
phenomenon may stem from fears of infection by the COVID-19 virus as well as an inability to
access abortion clinics due to childcare or transit disruptions. 8 The World Health Organization
(WHO) recommends telemedicine and self-managed abortion care during the pandemic, but this
requires changing medical abortion policies for in-person dispensing of mifepristone, a drug used
in medical abortions. 9
On May 27, 2020, counsel for the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
filed a complaint for preliminary injunctive relief against the Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
to forego the in-person dispensing requirement during a global pandemic. 10 Plaintiffs argue that
this mandatory in-person dispensing policy unduly burdens patients’ constitutional right to seek

5
Id. at 1457; see B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology of Restricting Abortion During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (2020) (outlining litigation in the wake of state attempts to limit
abortion access under executive orders limiting “non-essential” or “non-urgent” medical procedures).
6
Abigail R.A. Aiken et al., Demand for Self-Managed Online Telemedicine Abortion in the United States During
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic, 136(4) OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 835, 835–36 (2020).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 837.
9
Id.
10
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. U.S. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 197 (D. Md. 2020).
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an abortion. 11 While the pandemic brings uncertainty to many in Mary’s situation, there is also a
growing uncertainty regarding the judiciary’s interpretation of the constitutional right to safe and
legal abortion.
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court greatly expanded
constitutional protection for women by establishing a fundamental right to obtain a safe and legal
abortion in the first trimester of gestation without governmental interference. 12 Nineteen years
later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s fundamental right to a safe
and legal abortion but allowed government regulation in the first trimester, effectively limiting the
constitutional protection afforded to abortion. 13 “Only where state regulation[s] impose[] an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart”
of this fundamental right. 14
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court again expanded the
constitutional protection for a woman’s right to a safe and legal abortion by requiring a deeper
judicial look into the medical effects of a law regulating abortion under Casey’s undue burden
standard. 15 Last year, the Court’s plurality opinion in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo
indicated that the justices could no longer agree on the proper interpretation of Casey. 16
The realization of women’s fundamental right to abortion not only faces uncertainties
brought by a global pandemic, but also uncertainties in judicial interpretation and application of
that right. In this article, I will examine the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on abortion rights.

11

Id. at 211–17.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14
Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
15
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
16
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
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65

Then, I will review whether growing disagreements in applying Casey’s undue burden standard
would again limit constitutional protections to the fundamental right to abortion in the time of
COVID-19 and in future cases.
II. ORIGIN OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
Before addressing substantive law on abortion rights in the United States, it is important to
understand a court’s approach to fundamental rights in the Constitution.
First, courts must determine whether a right is fundamental. Generally, courts determine a
fundamental right in historical terms. A fundamental right is a liberty “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.” 17 Other scholars advocate that fundamental rights are those
supported by a moral consensus within society. 18 No matter the perspective, a fundamental right
must be one that a court sees as requiring special protection from governmental intrusion. If a
fundamental right is at stake, a challenged law must survive strict scrutiny by a court; if not, then
the challenged law need only survive an intermediate or rational basis level of scrutiny. 19
Courts will uphold a law unless it “prejudice[s] against discrete and insular minorities[.]” 20
If a law affects minorities, then a court “may call for a correspondingly more searching [thorough]
judicial inquiry.” 21 Simply, if a law unjustly applies a suspect classification based on an immutable
characteristic (race, gender, national origin) then a court will apply its most thorough review

17

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication,
83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973); see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (noting that denationalization for
military desertion was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because this
protection for individuals against excessive governmental treatment “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
19
WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:3 (3d ed. 2019).
20
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (holding that a Congressional Act
prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounds was constitutional and did not require
heightened judicial scrutiny because ample evidence of health concerns reinforces its purpose).
21
Id.
18
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(known as strict scrutiny) to that law. 22
Second, if a law infringes on a fundamental right then the government must show a
compelling state interest that justifies its infringement of that right. 23 If the infringed right is not
fundamental, then a court only requires an important or legitimate interest justifying the
government’s infringement. 24 For instance, in abortion cases, the fundamental right at play is the
individual woman’s right to choose while the governmental interest is the health and preservation
of life for both the mother and child. Courts must decide whether government’s justification for
laws regulating a woman’s right to abortion sufficiently justify the law’s continuation.
Finally, even if the government shows a sufficiently compelling or legitimate interest, it
must also show that the law is necessary to achieve that interest. 25 To do this, government must
prove it could not achieve its claimed interest through less restrictive means than by infringing the
fundamental right. For a law impeding a fundamental right backed by compelling governmental
interest, it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; for a law impeding other rights not
guaranteed by the Constitution and backed by a legitimate governmental interest, it must be only
substantially related to achieving that interest. 26 Thus, if the government attempts to regulate a
fundamental right, then the law infringing that right must do so as little as possible. If there is no
fundamental right at issue, then courts will give broader deference to the legislature. Generally, to

22

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a law prohibiting interracial marriage discriminated
one’s immutable characteristic of race and ruled unconstitutional under strict scrutiny); see Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that a law discriminated one’s immutable characteristic of national origin but
national security interests justified its enactment); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that a
law discriminating based on gender dealt with an immutable characteristic and calls for strict scrutiny analysis); see
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that laws impacting citizens with a mental
disability is not discrimination based on an immutable characteristic requiring strict scrutiny).
23
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
24
RICH, supra note 19, at § 11:8.
25
Id. § 11:4.
26
Id. § 11:3.
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summarize:
Level of Court Scrutiny
Strict Scrutiny
Intermediate
Scrutiny/Rational Basis

Required Level of
Government Interest
Compelling

Required Scope of the
Contested Law
Narrowly Tailored Means

Important/Legitimate

Substantially/Reasonably
Related Means

Table 1: Standards of Review 27

Courts use this framework to determine the extent of a fundamental right’s constitutional
protection from government intrusion.
A. Early Interpretation of Reproductive Autonomy: A Broader Right to Privacy
The first expansion of women’s right to privacy over reproductive autonomy occurred eight
years before Roe v. Wade, paving the way for privacy rights extending to marriage, sexual
orientation, and abortion. 28
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of a
Connecticut law criminalizing both the use of contraceptives and the aiding of patients in
preventing conception through contraceptives. 29 Appellants advised married couples on
appropriate ways to prevent conception through contraceptives. 30 They argued that the law
banning use and advisement of contraceptives violated the patient’s personal liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 In a 7-2 plurality decision, the Supreme Court

27

Michael K. Steenson, Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, “Constitutional Law: Liberties”
(Feb. 2019).
28
Lesson Plan: Landmark Supreme Court Case: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), CSPAN CLASSROOM (Apr. 4,
2018).
29
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 480–82; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (noting that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”).
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held Connecticut’s law unconstitutional because of its invasion into a person’s personal sphere of
privacy as protected by the Constitution even though the words “right to privacy” are not in its
text. 32
Conscious of this, Justice Douglas addressed where to find this “right to privacy” within
the Constitution. He began by stating what the Court was not doing. “We do not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions.” 33 To determine the extent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection, the Court notes that other amendments in the Constitution also extend to rights not
found in its text. 34
The [right to] association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the
Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice—
whether public or private or parochial—is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to
study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has
been construed to include [a guarantee] of those rights. 35
The First Amendment protects not only speech and the press, but also a right to distribute and
receive information. 36 These examples “suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras [fringe rights], formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance.” 37 Simply, protections of individual action fulfilling the principles put forth in the
32

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding that Defendants had standing to bring the case because this law criminally
convicts them in serving married couples but third party standing in abortion cases is another area of dispute); see
Brandon L. Winchel, Note, The Double Standard for Third-Party Standing: June Medical and the Continuation of
Disparate Standing Doctrine, 96(1) Notre Dame L. Rev. 421 (2020); Stephen J. Wallace, Note, Why Third-Party
Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer Look, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1369 (2009).
33
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
34
Id.
35
Id.; see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the right to educate one’s children as one
chooses applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(holding that the right to study the German language applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
36
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482; see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding that a city
ordinance prohibiting distribution of pamphlets and advertisements at individual’s homes violated a Jehovah’s
Witness’ implicit First Amendment right to distribute and receive information).
37
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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First Amendment give weight and substance to this fundamental right. To fully protect a street
corner advocate’s right to free speech, the Constitution must also protect their right to distribute
ideas through their chosen means.
Similarly, various amendments, including the First Amendment’s right to association,
guarantee an individual’s “zone of privacy” and so shows its importance to the liberty of American
citizens. 38 The Ninth Amendment’s declaration that all rights listed in the Constitution “shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” lends weight to a general right to
privacy from government intrusion. 39
In Griswold, Justice Douglas concluded that the Connecticut law forbidding women’s use
of contraceptives regulates “a relationship lying within th[is] zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees.” 40 The intimate marriage relationship is an area of privacy
in which laws having a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” 41 Though not stated, Justice Douglas alludes to
the idea that a law infringing a right so fundamental to citizens, such as private actions within a
marital relationship, must be narrowly tailored.
Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the concept of one’s personal
liberty “is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights” when read with the Ninth

38
Id. (noting the Third Amendment’s prohibition to quartering soldiers without the homeowner’s consent
expresses a privacy right, the Fourth Amendment’s right of the people to be secure from unreasonable government
intrusion expresses a privacy right, while the Fifth Amendment guarantees a defendant may protect themselves in
certain privacy rights from which government may not cross); see U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV & V; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that this right to privacy extends to not only private property but also to a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in semi-public areas).
39
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
40
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
41
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
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Amendment. 42 Its language shows that “the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are
additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside
those fundamental rights specifically mentioned” elsewhere in the Constitution. 43 Though the
legislature may make laws as they see fit, Justice Goldberg “do[es] not believe that this includes
the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens[.]” 44 This Connecticut law
violating a marriage relationship’s fundamental right to privacy can only stand if the government
shows an “interest which is compelling.” 45 Connecticut’s legitimate (but not compelling) interest
in protecting marital relationships “can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which
does not . . . sweep unnecessarily broadly” in banning all use of contraceptives. 46 Justice White,
concurring in Griswold, held that laws intruding on one’s fundamental right to privacy must be
subject to strict scrutiny, backed by a compelling governmental interest, and narrowly tailored to
meet that interest. 47
In dissent, Justice Black disagrees with this broad constitutional right to privacy. Though
Justice Black thought this law was offensive, he would have held it as constitutional. 48 Defendants
knowingly engaged in advising married couples to violate this law. 49 “Merely because some
speech was used in [this conduct] . . . [the Court is] not . . . justified in holding that the First
Amendment forbids the State to punish their conduct.” 50 The plurality opinions discuss a
constitutional right of privacy “as though there is some constitutional provision . . . forbidding any

42

Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 488.
44
Id. at 496.
45
Id. at 497–98.
46
Id. at 498.
47
Id. at 503.
48
Id. at 507.
49
Id. at 508.
50
Id.
43
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law ever to be passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there is not.” 51 Justice
Black warns that this type of constitutional interpretation distorts the textual meaning to give it the
flexibility required to meet the Court’s preferential outcome. 52
The decision in Griswold greatly expanded what liberties the Supreme Court considers as
a constitutionally protected fundamental right.
B. Abortion Rights in the Twentieth Century: An Established Fundamental Right and Its Unduly
Burdened Demotion
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established a woman’s fundamental right to an abortion
free from governmental regulation during the first trimester. 53 In Casey, the Court reaffirmed this
right but removed Roe’s absolute protection to a woman’s fundamental right in the first trimester. 54
This development limits the Constitutional protection to one’s privacy for abortion.
In Roe, the Court analyzed a Texas law, and similar Georgia law, making it a crime to
procure, or attempt to procure, an abortion except to save the life of the mother. 55 Jane Roe was
an unmarried woman seeking an abortion but could not do so because her life was not in danger if
the pregnancy continued. 56 Like Griswold, Roe claimed this Texas law violated her right to
personal privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 57 But the Court
resisted Griswold’s broad analysis and looked to history as a supplement. 58
Justice Blackmun, in a plurality opinion, set out a brief history of some cultures embracing

51

Id.
Id. at 509.
53
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that after the first trimester, the state’s interest grows legitimate
and even compelling as the pregnancy progresses).
54
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (holding that the government’s interest in protecting
life need only be legitimate and not compelling).
55
Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18.
56
Id. at 120.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 118–46.
52
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the open practice of abortion. 59 Generally in common law, governments applied harsher criminal
penalties on abortions after the moment of “quickening” (first recognizable movement of the fetus
in utero). 60 Historically, United States laws penalized aborting both a quickened and un-quickened
fetus, but the diminished penalties of aborting an un-quickened fetus suggested to the Court that
an individual’s right to abortion was stronger early in pregnancy. 61
By 1973, danger to the mother’s life during an abortion procedure decreased with the
introduction of modern medical techniques. 62 With the aid of antibiotics, “data indicat[ed] that
abortion in early pregnancy . . . prior to the end of the first trimester . . . [was] now relatively
safe.” 63 Given this information, the Court was ready to follow Griswold’s lead: “[t]his right of
privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy[,]” and so is a fundamental right. 64
To protect this right, the Court determined that the government may not regulate abortion
within the first trimester of pregnancy. 65 But it also acknowledges that as the embryo grows during
pregnancy, the government’s increasing interest in protecting the life of the embryo overtakes the
woman’s fundamental right to an abortion. 66 The Court holds that after the first trimester, “the
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation [to preserve life].” 67

59

Id.
Id. at 132, 138 (noting that an 1821 Connecticut law charging a misdemeanor for abortion of an un-quickened
fetus and second-degree manslaughter for abortion of a quickened fetus).
61
Id. at 139.
62
Id. at 149.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 152–53 (“only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ . . . are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy.”).
65
Id. at 163.
66
Id. at 153.
67
Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
60
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The right to abortion appears to require strict scrutiny in the first trimester, but then
diminishes to a lower level of judicial scrutiny over time as the government’s interest in the
preservation of life increases. The Court ultimately establishes a three-trimester framework to
determine where individual and government interests are at their highest. 68

The three-trimester framework creates a zone of privacy around first trimester abortions in which
there is no justifiable governmental regulation. This protection expands women’s right to an
abortion and privacy from government intrusion.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist commended the historical and legal analysis but does not
believe that a right to privacy is involved. 69 He believed that the Court’s “conscious weighing of
competing factors . . . is far more appropriate to a legislative [body].” 70
The social impacts of Roe v. Wade are apparent. Before Roe, illegal abortion estimates

68

Id. at 163.
Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 173.
69
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ranged between 200,000 and 1,200,000 per year in the 1950’s and 1960’s. 71 In 1969, illegal
abortions in New York City accounted for 23% of all pregnancy-related hospital admissions. 72 In
1973, 36% of abortions occurred at or before eight weeks of pregnancy; today, 91.4% of all legal
abortions occur within the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy. 73 Abortion counseling has also
changed. At the time of Roe, counselors saw themselves as advocates. 74 Physicians did not know
their role in this now nationally legal operation. After legalization, counsellors became advisors,
informing patients of their options moving forward as well as providing emotional counseling to
women having moral hesitations with the procedure. 75 “The political debate over abortion has
largely ignored the public health fact that the Roe v. Wade decision did not create or change the
need for abortion; legalization simply made abortion safe.” 76 As of 2013, 0.3% of 1.2 million
abortion patients per year experience a complication requiring hospitalization. 77 Between 1973
and 2014, doctors performed more than fifty million abortions in the United States, equating to
more than one million abortions per year. 78
Nineteen years after Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court approached the fundamental right to
abortion again in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of 1982

71

Medical and Social Health Benefits Since Abortion was Made Legal in the U.S., PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/eb/38/eb38bdf9-7ebb-4067-875813d28afa1d51/pp_med_soc_benefits_abortion_final_1.pdf (last updated Jan. 2015).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Carole Joffe, The Politicization of Abortion and the Evolution of Abortion Counseling, 103(1) AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH, 57, 59–60 (2013).
75
Id. at 60–62.
76
Susan Yanow, It Is Time to Integrate Abortion Into Primary Care, 103(1) AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 14, 14–15
(2013).
77
Id.
78
Stephen A. McCurdy, Abortion and Public Health: Time for Another Look, 83(1) THE LINACRE Q. 20, 24
(2016); but see CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
https://cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2020) (providing the number of
reported abortions throughout the United States between 2009–2018 totaling 6,790,706 equating to 679,071 of
reported abortions per year).
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required a woman seeking an abortion to give her informed consent to the tending physician while
receiving certain information within twenty-four hours of the procedure. 79 It also required married
women to sign a statement proving that she notified her husband of her intended abortion. 80 In a
5-4 plurality opinion, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s fundamental right to an abortion. 81 But it
rejected Roe v. Wade’s three-trimester framework and its prohibition of government interference
within the first trimester of pregnancy. 82 Instead, the Court held that a fetus’ viability,
. . . is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing
a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in
reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights
of the woman. 83
In cases between Roe and Casey, courts “decided that any regulation . . . must survive strict
scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest.” 84
But the Court in Casey noted that this interpretation conflicts with Roe v. Wade; the government
“has legitimate interests in the health of the woman and in protecting the potential life within
her.” 85
Under Casey, laws regulating abortion are unconstitutional “[o]nly where [it] imposes an
undue burden on a woman’s ability” to get an abortion. 86 An undue burden means a law with “the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.” 87 Government regulations “which do no more than create a structural mechanism

79

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
Id.
81
Id. at 845–46.
82
Id. at 872–73.
83
Id. at 870.
84
Id. at 871.
85
Id. (emphasis added) (noting that this fundamental right does not call for strict scrutiny, unlike other
fundamental rights, but rather a lower level of scrutiny).
86
Id. at 874.
87
Id. at 877.
80

76

by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” 88
In Casey, the Court held that the government’s interest to inform a patient of relevant health
risks about abortion justified its informed consent requirement. 89 This portion of the law is a
structural mechanism that does not amount to a substantial obstacle in obtaining an abortion. 90 But
the law’s requirement for proof of spousal consent may pose a substantial obstacle to a patient
seeking an abortion. 91 “Many may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their
husbands, including verbal harassment, threats of future violence . . . withdrawal of financial
support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends.” 92 This portion of Pennsylvania’s
law is unconstitutional because it places a substantial obstacle unduly burdening a woman’s right
to abortion. 93
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, said the Court did not go far enough. “A stateimposed burden on the exercise of a constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its
character: A burden may be ‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a
legitimate, rational justification.” 94 Justice Stevens argued that the informed consent requirement
is also unconstitutional because “such a delay serves [no] useful and legitimate purpose.” 95 This
interpretation calls for a higher level of judicial scrutiny throughout all three trimesters.
Though Roe expanded women’s fundamental right to privacy and access to safe and legal

88

Id.
Id. at 882.
90
Id. at 883.
91
Id. at 893.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 893–94.
94
Id. at 920.
95
Id. at 921.
89

77

abortion free from governmental intrusion, Casey changed the character of this fundamental right
and limited its protection. The government may now regulate abortion early in pregnancies as long
as it does not unduly burden abortion access. The fundamental right to abortion does not call for a
compelling governmental interest with laws narrowly tailored to meet that interest, but only a
legitimate governmental interest with laws substantially tailored to meet that interest. 96
C. Abortion Rights in the Twenty First Century: A Balancing Interpretation with Signs of
Disfavor
Both Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo
again tested the Supreme Court’s interpretation of laws regulating a woman’s right to abortion. 97
In Whole Woman’s Health, a 5-4 plurality opinion, Texas abortion providers sued to
invalidate two laws regulating their clinics. 98 An admitting-privileges requirement directed
physicians who perform abortions to have active admitting privileges at a hospital no farther than
thirty miles from the clinic, while a surgical-center requirement compelled abortion facilities to
have minimum safety standards equivalent to ambulatory surgical centers. 99
While the District Court invalidated these regulations as unduly burdening a woman’s right
to abortion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that ruling as inconsistent with the
undue burden standard established in Casey. 100 It expressed the standard as a state law “regulating
previability abortion is constitutional if: (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is
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reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate interest.” 101
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, held that this was an incomplete interpretation of
Casey because the first element “requires . . . the courts [to] consider the burdens a law imposes
on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.” 102 This definition, the dissent
argued, is the Supreme Court’s attempt to apply heightened judicial scrutiny when analyzing
Texas’ law because it may affect a woman’s fundamental right to abortion. 103
Texas first argued that the benefit of the admitting-privileges requirement is to “help ensure
that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion
procedure.” 104 The Supreme Court pushed back with medical testimony noting that complications
were rare in early pregnancy abortions. 105 The highest rate or major abortion complications,
including those requiring hospital admission “was less than one-quarter of 1%.” 106 “The [district]
court found that ‘[t]he great weight of evidence demonstrates that, before the [admitting-privileges
requirement’s] passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of serious
complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure.’ Thus, there was no
significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.” 107 The law did not appear to
accomplish its alleged benefit.
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Texas’ law also posed a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman’s ability to have an
abortion because of its impact on local abortion clinics. Since many clinics were not within thirty
miles of a hospital, eight clinics closed before the law’s effective date and eleven more closed soon
after. 108 “These closures meant “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding”
effectively limiting the locations in which a woman could access a safe and legal abortion. 109 The
admitting-privileges requirement placed a substantial obstacle to abortion access and provided
minimal medical benefits to patients. 110 The Supreme Court held that the admitting-privileges
requirement unconstitutionally placed an undue burden on the fundamental right to abortion. 111
Texas next argued that the surgical-center requirement establishes high safety standards in
local clinics to protect women during their procedure should complications arise. 112 The Supreme
Court, however, noted that safety “risks are not appreciably lowered for patients who undergo
abortions at ambulatory surgical centers as compared to nonsurgical-center facilities.” 113
Moreover, medically-induced abortions rarely have complications and those that do arise usually
occur after a patient has left the facility. 114 Renovating clinics to bring the facility up to ambulatory
surgical standards also posed an economic burden. 115 Unaffordable renovations may force closures
leaving the few open clinics with strained capacity. 116 The surgical-center requirement also placed
a substantial obstacle in the path of women attending an open clinic, provided minimal benefits,

108

Id. at 2312.
Id. at 2313.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 2300–01.
112
Id. at 2314.
113
Id. at 2315.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 2296–97 (noting that upgrade renovations of existing clinics would cost between $1.5–$3 million dollars
to comply with ambulatory surgical requirements).
116
Id.; see id. at 2299 (noting that if clinics continued to close due to the surgical-center requirement, then the
remaining clinics may need to accommodate an increased capacity by a factor of about five).
109

80

and did not further Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women who may have complications
during a procedure. 117 The Court held that the surgical-center requirement unconstitutionally
placed an undue burden on the fundamental right to abortion. 118
In his dissent, Justice Thomas opposed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Casey and its
intent to weigh a law’s burden on abortion access together with the benefit it confers. 119 “Casey
did not balance the benefits and burdens of Pennsylvania’s spousal and parental notification
provisions, . . . [it] imposed an undue burden because findings established that the requirement
would ‘likely . . . prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion’—not
because these burdens outweighed its benefits.” 120 This interpretation is “nowhere to be found in
Casey or its successors, and transform[s] the undue-burden test to something much more akin to
strict scrutiny.” 121
Whole Woman’s Health raised the level of scrutiny established in Casey. 122 Justice
Breyer’s interpretation appears to also embrace Justice Stevens’ interpretation in his partial
concurrence and dissent opinion in Casey. 123
The Supreme Court again applied this higher level of scrutiny to laws regulating abortion
in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo. In Russo, it addressed a nearly identical admitting-
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privileges requirement in Louisiana. 124 Three abortion clinics and two abortion providers sued
arguing it unconstitutionally “imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an
abortion.” 125 In a 5-4 plurality opinion, Justice Breyer applied the same undue burden standard as
in Whole Woman’s Health; laws furthering a legitimate state interest regulating abortion are
unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s right to choose. 126 To assess a substantial obstacle, the Court should consider the burdens
that a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits that a law confers. 127
First, the Court analyzed the law’s burdens on abortion clinics and providers. 128 Evidence
showed four of these providers tried—in good faith—to obtain admitting privileges but failed “for
reasons that had nothing to do with their ability to perform abortions safely.” 129 Even if providers
in Louisiana obtained admitting privileges to a nearby hospital, they may lose privileges for failing
to meet minimum hospital admission requirements due to the low number of complications during
abortion procedures. 130 As a result, many clinics would close leaving only a few to serve large
areas of Louisiana. 131 The Court held that Louisiana’s admitting-privileges requirement placed a
heavy burden on a woman’s right to an abortion. 132
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Second, the Supreme Court assessed the medical benefits of Louisiana’s admittingprivileges requirement and found none. 133 It concluded that “‘[c]omplications from surgical
abortion are relatively rare,’ and ‘[t]hey very rarely require transfer to a hospital or emergency
room and are generally not serious.’” 134 Furthermore, complications from medically-induced
abortions usually arise after the patient has left the facility. 135 The Court therefore determined that
the admitting-privileges requirement provided no medical benefit. 136
After weighing the burdens and benefits of Louisiana’s law, four of the five Justices in the
majority held that it effectively posed a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s right to an
abortion. 137 The law also did not further Louisiana’s legitimate interest to protect the health and
safety of women. 138 Thus, Louisiana’s admitting-privileges requirement was unconstitutional. 139
Chief Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, signaled his discontent in the Court’s
application of Casey’s undue burden standard. 140 He notes that measuring a law’s potential burden
together with its benefits is impossible and not a job for this Court: “[C]ourts applying [this]
balancing test would be asked in essence to weigh the [government’s] interests ‘in protecting the
potentiality of human life’ and the health of the woman, on one hand, against the woman’s liberty
interest in defining her ‘own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life’ on the other. There is no plausible sense in which anyone, let alone this Court, could
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objectively assign weight to such imponderable values and no meaningful way to compare them
if there were. Attempting to do so would be like ‘judging whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy[.]’” 141
Simply put, interpreting the undue burden standard as requiring analysis of the burdens a
law imposes together with the benefits those laws confer, conflicts with the precedent established
in Casey and is an improper application of the undue burden standard. 142 Chief Justice Roberts’
concurrence in Russo is a sign that five members of the Court would disregard any potential
benefits a law may have when regulating abortion and only focus on whether it poses a substantial
obstacle to abortion access.
III. ABORTION RIGHTS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic is a new unforeseeable burden on existing abortion regulations
compounding the growing disagreement of judicial interpretation. As of March 18, 2021, there
have been 29,431,658 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the United States resulting in 535,217
deaths. 143 Early in the pandemic, governors throughout the United States considered abortions
“non-essential” and closed clinics to preserve personal protective equipment for healthcare
workers. 144 These closures barred women’s access to safe and legal abortions during a critical time
of their pregnancy. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s latest abortion
surveillance data from 2016, 91% of the 623,471 recorded abortions occurred within the first 13
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weeks of pregnancy. 145 The decision to close abortion clinics during the pandemic could have
delayed about 32,732 abortions between March 22 and April 12, 2020. 146
Though many governors now define abortion access as essential healthcare, telemedicine
may be an important way to access medication abortions while meeting safety guidelines during
the pandemic. Four policies in the United States impede telemedicine use:
(1) State laws requiring separate, in-person counseling followed by a waiting period before
medical or surgical abortion;
(2) State laws requiring an ultrasound at the time of the abortion;
(3) State laws mandating the prescribing clinician to be physically present during
mifepristone administration; and
(4) The FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for mifepristone, a
medical inducing abortion pill, mandating in-person drug dispensing to patients within
a clinic or hospital setting under supervision of the prescriber. 147
A. The FDA Regulation of Mifepristone
In 2000, the FDA approved the use of mifepristone with another pill called misoprostol
(both used for nonsurgical abortions). 148 Recognizing mifepristone can cause incomplete abortions
or serious bleeding, the FDA administered REMS for mifepristone because of its adverse effects
requiring that the “drug be dispensed to patients only in certain health care settings,” such as
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hospitals, clinics, or offices under the supervision of a certified provider. 149 Upon review in 2016,
the FDA concluded that no new safety concerns arose since 2007, the known serious risks occur
rarely, and that future serious adverse events will remain low. 150 As a result, the FDA allowed
patients to self-administer “based on the finding that there is ‘no significant difference in either
efficacy or safety’ for women who take both mifepristone and misoprostol at home as compared
to women who take mifepristone at a medical office and misoprostol at home.” 151 However, the
FDA still required patients to pick up mifepristone, in person, at a designated health care setting
while under the supervision of a healthcare provider. 152
To receive mifepristone, healthcare providers must first determine a patient’s eligibility
through an interview. 153 The FDA does not regulate in what manner this assessment occurs. 154 The
initial interview may occur either in person or through telemedicine. 155 Next, the healthcare
provider counsels the patients on mifepristone’s risks, use of the drug, and follow-up care. 156
Finally, the patient must obtain mifepristone in person at a hospital, clinic, or medical office in
accordance with FDA regulations. 157
On March 13, 2020, the president of the United States declared a national emergency in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, giving the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
emergency authority “to temporarily waive or modify certain requirements of the Medicare,
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Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance programs . . .” throughout the COVID-19
outbreak. 158 In response, the Secretary of HHS waived in-person dispensing requirements for
certain drugs but not for mifepristone. 159
Medical professionals and reproductive activists quickly sued the FDA to forgo its required
in-person distribution of mifepristone during the pandemic in American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists v. United States FDA. 160
B. Resulting Medication Abortion Care
Diminished access to abortion care is one unintended effect of the recent pandemic. Many
medical offices have closed or reduced their capacity to comply with government safety
regulations. 161 Procuring transportation to attend the in-person requirement amid the pandemic can
be particularly difficult for patients with lower incomes as well as minority communities. 162
Arranging childcare during in-person medical visits is another complication for some
patients. “[T]his challenge is more acute during the pandemic because many schools and daycare
centers have closed . . . ” and medical offices may not allow patients’ children to come with them
to appointments. 163 Issues with transportation and childcare during the pandemic have also
disproportionately affected minority communities. 164
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In American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. United States FDA, medical
experts testified that, “[T]elemedicine can be used to meet the REMS requirements of an
assessment of an abortion patient, required counseling and discussion of the Patient Agreement
Form, and securing of a signature on that form without having to meet in person with the patient .
. . [M]ifepristone can be safely and promptly delivered by mail or delivery services to a patient at
or near the time of the signing of the Patient Agreement Form. Accordingly, [the medical experts]
conclude that in light of telemedicine, the In-Person Requirements are medically unnecessary.” 165

Though the pandemic placed unintended effects on abortion access, telemedicine appears to
be a workable alternative to avoid possible burdens on abortion access while continuing to respect
the benefits of safety furthered by the FDA’s regulation on mifepristone.
C. Weighing the Burdens and Benefits During COVID-19
In determining whether the FDA’s in-person dispensing requirement of mifepristone
unduly burdens a woman’s fundamental right to abortion access in a pandemic, the Federal District
Court of Maryland followed the Supreme Court’s process in Whole Woman’s Health. 166 The
district court considered the burdens the law imposed on abortion access together with the benefits
the law confers, to find whether it posed a substantial obstacle to women seeking a medication
abortion. 167
First, the district court assessed the burdens the in-person dispensing requirement places
on patients seeking medication abortions. 168 Many patients eligible for mifepristone are
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susceptible to increased travel costs, difficulties in securing transportation, a potential need to
arrange childcare, and overwhelming healthcare providers struggling with increased demand
because of closures. 169 Also, “[b]ecause many individuals infected with [COVID-19] lack
symptoms, . . . any time that abortion patients venture out of their residence, including to fulfill
the In-Person Requirements, they risk contracting a highly dangerous disease.” 170
The FDA argued that risks to any abortion patient traveling to a medical office is low and
the overall difficulty of travel does not amount to a substantial obstacle. 171 But this argument
contradicts the FDA’s decision to waive in-person requirements for other drugs to minimize health
risks. 172 The in-person dispensing requirement did pose a substantial obstacle to women seeking
medication abortions because it posed both safety and economic challenges to the patient. 173
Second, the district court assessed the benefits that the in-person dispensing requirement
provides patients seeking medication abortions. 174 According to Dr. Allison Bryant Mantha (“Dr.
Bryant”) an OB/GYN at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston and an associate professor at
Harvard Medical School, “there is no clinical reason to require patients to travel to a clinic,
hospital, or medical office in person to obtain mifepristone.” 175 The court concluded that
healthcare providers can assess a patient’s eligibility to use mifepristone through telemedicine; if
a healthcare provider, in their best medical judgment, requires an in-person meeting, then this can
occur. 176
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The FDA argued that the in-person dispensing requirement is necessary for healthcare
counseling, mitigating serious risks associated with mifepristone use, and preventing delays in
filling prescriptions, which may occur through mail or commercial carriers. 177 Yet, the court
emphasized, telemedicine is available to counsel the patient on risks associated with mifepristone
without meeting in person. 178 There is also little evidence that removing the in-person dispensing
requirement will cause delays in taking the medication, as commercial carriers are capable of
same-day delivery. 179 In fact, there appears to be little actual health benefit to the in-person
dispensing requirement. According to Dr. Bryant, “[t]here is no safety or medical benefit in
requiring patients to make a trip to the health care facility just to pick up the mifepristone.” 180
Finally, the district court measured the burdens of the in-person dispensing requirement
against its benefits. “[T]he more substantial the burden, the stronger the [FDA]’s justification for
the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test; conversely, the stronger the [FDA]’s justification,
the greater the burden may be before it becomes ‘undue.’” 181 It held that the in-person dispensing
requirement most likely does pose a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s fundamental
right to an abortion without adequate justification and therefore is likely unconstitutional. 182
On July 13, 2020, the District Court ruled for the plaintiff’s preliminary injunctive relief
claim noting “the In-Person Requirements, combined with the COVID-19 pandemic, place a
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking medication abortion and that may delay or
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preclude a medication abortion and thus may necessitate a more invasive procedure.” 183 As a
result, the FDA must allow dispensing mifepristone absent in-person contact unless the prescribing
physician, in their expert medical opinion, requires an in-person visit. 184 This ruling, however, is
not indefinite. It is only enforceable until this case has finished, or the Secretary of Health and
Human Services ends the public health emergency declared under 42 U.S.C. § 247d, whichever
comes first. 185
On August 26, 2020, the FDA appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the in-person
dispensing requirement is a long-established safety check, there are still surgical methods of
abortion available, and the pandemic’s incidental effects on abortion access does not make a law
unconstitutional especially when government action is not the cause. 186 On October 8, 2020, the
Supreme Court denied the FDA’s appeal to review its request to stay the lower court’s order on
the merits. 187 A dissent by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, accompanied the Court’s denial
for review expressing the inconsistencies in the Court’s recent rulings on “COVID-19-related
public safety measures.” 188
In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, the Supreme Court upheld a
Governor’s Executive Order limiting attendance of public gatherings three months earlier. 189
Religious institutions argued this order violated their right to religious practice under the Free
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Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 190 Though the Executive Order limited the number of
worshipers in a church, it also limited public gatherings in secular settings and so did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. 191 Furthermore, public officials have broad discretion when acting in
areas of medical and scientific uncertainty in the interest of public safety. 192 The Court allowed
government intrusion to an individual’s First Amendment fundamental right to gather and freely
practice religion by giving elected officials broad discretion in actions furthering the health and
safety of the public during a pandemic. But it did not review the FDA’s appeal to enforce its inperson dispensing requirement furthering protection of women who wish to obtain an abortion.
Justice Alito noted that decisions by an unelected federal judiciary, lacking medical
expertise, should give latitude to the government’s medical experts. 193 “While COVID-19 has
provided the ground for restrictions on First Amendment rights, the District Court saw the
pandemic as a ground for expanding the abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade.” 194
D. Abortion Rights Without the Benefit of Assessing Medical Benefits
If the Supreme Court continues to defer to the legislature when assessing medical benefits
of laws regulating abortion, then judicial protection of a woman’s fundamental right to abortion
will diminish. Following Russo, lower courts are already following Chief Justice Roberts’
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interpretation of Casey instead of Justice Breyer’s interpretation.
In EMWomen’s Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Friedlander, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit determined the constitutionality of a Kentucky regulation “requiring abortion
facilities to obtain transfer agreements with a local hospital and transport agreements with local
ambulance service[s].” 195 When a Supreme Court opinion garners a split majority, as in Russo,
lower courts must “treat the ‘position taken by [the Justice or Justices] who concurred in the
judgment[] on the narrowest grounds’ as ‘the holding of the Court.’” 196 Justice Breyer’s
interpretation in Russo, judicially scrutinizing a law’s medical benefits, would presumably
invalidate more laws than Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation. 197 Chief Justice Roberts’
concurrence therefore controls as precedent for lower courts in abortion-related cases. 198
Following Chief Justice Roberts in Russo, the Sixth Circuit Court determined that a law
regulating abortion is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and does not have
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus. 199
Like the government’s health-related justifications for its admitting-privileges requirement
in Whole Woman’s Health and Russo, Kentucky justified its transfer—and transport—requirement
as a safety precaution if abortion-related complications arise in its facilities. 200 The Circuit Court
reasoned that “state and federal legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas
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where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.” 201 Courts, therefore, lack the authority to
determine whether a state’s reason for its regulation is medically sensible. 202 Kentucky’s
transfer—and transport—requirement is a reasonable protection for women who suffer
complications during an abortion procedure and is reasonably related to Kentucky’s legitimate
interest in protecting the health of women seeking abortion. 203
For Kentucky’s transfer—and transport—requirement to pose a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking an abortion, abortion clinics must show that their facilities would close if
the requirement took effect despite making a good faith attempt to comply. 204 Kentucky’s abortion
clinics failed to do so. 205 Following Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Russo, the Circuit Court
upheld Kentucky’s transfer—and transport—requirement because it was reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest and did not pose a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an
abortion. 206
The Supreme Court will continue to give greater deference to legislatures in abortionrelated cases when medical benefits are at play. 207 This approach once again effectively lowers the
Court’s scrutiny in such cases.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s protection of the constitutional right to abortion expands and
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Id. at 438 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)); see June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140
S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment); see Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (holding that Congress’
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was constitutional by deferring to the Legislature’s medical justifications).
202
EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 978 F.3d at 438.
203
Id. at 438–39.
204
Id. at 440; see June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2141 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
205
EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 978 F.3d at 442–45.
206
Id. at 446.
207
See June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., dissenting); see EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C.,
978 F.3d at 438 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation of the undue burden test in Russo is the controlling
standard and calls for deference to legislative bodies when determining a law’s health benefits when regulating
abortion).
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contracts as the Court changes its members. In Roe, the Court greatly expanded women’s access
to safe abortion procedures by establishing a fundamental right and prohibiting governmental
regulation in the first trimester. In Casey, the Court limited this right by allowing government to
regulate abortion during pre-viability so long as it had a legitimate purpose to do so, and its law
did not pose a substantial obstacle to women seeking a safe and legal abortion. In Whole Woman’s
Health, the Court interpreted Casey’s undue burden standard as requiring analysis of a law’s
burden on women’s access to abortion as well as its medical benefits effectively raising the
required judicial scrutiny in abortion-related cases. Last year in Russo, a majority of the Supreme
Court no longer agrees with this interpretation.
Roe v. Wade’s fundamental right to a safe and legal abortion is part of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. But women’s realization of this fundamental right may garner limited judicial
protection for years to come due to unforeseen difficulties brought by the COVID-19 pandemic,
as well as growing disagreement on the Supreme Court.
***

95

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Mitchell Hamline Open Access is the digital archive of Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
Its mission is to preserve and provide access to our scholarly activities, for the benefit of
researchers and members of the legal community.
Mitchell Hamline Open Access is a service of the Warren E. Burger Library.
open.mitchellhamline.edu

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

